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ESSAY
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CENSURE
Michael J. Gerhardt*
It has become commonplace for commentators to suggest
that, in the aftermath of the Senate's acquittal of President
William Jefferson Clinton, there have been only losers and no
real winners. Whether this is true generally is a difficult ques-
tion to which I will not hazard an answer. It is beyond ques-
tion, however, that one device that lost ground as a result of
the storm of impeachment was censure. That censure has taken
a severe beating is unfortunate because so much of the beating
was based on misguided interpretations of, or arguments about,
the Constitution.
The truth is that censure-understood as a resolution critical
of the President passed by one or both houses of Congress-is
plainly constitutional.' There might be good policy reasons to
argue against the use of censure, such as censure is not partic-
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary School. of Law. BA., 1978,
Yale University; M.Sc., 1979, London School of Economics; J.D., 1982, University of
Chicago. I want to thank John Cunningham and the staff of the University of Rich-
mond Law Review for the invitation to contribute to this issue and for their interest
in and support of this essay.
1. It is noteworthy that, prior to the House's vote to impeach President Clinton,
Representative William Delahunt (D-Mass.) sought opinions regarding the constitu-
tionality of censure from the 19 constitutional scholars and historians who testified on
November 9, 1998, before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution. See Letter
from Representative William D. Delahunt to Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chair-
man, House Committee on the Judiciary (Dec. 4, 1998) (on file with author). Fourteen
of the scholars indicated that they thought censure was constitutional. See Letter
from Representatives William D. Delahunt and Frederick C. Boucher to Members of
the U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 15, 1998) (on file with authors).
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ularly effective or might be overused; however, the debates in
both the House and the Senate over censure blurred the line
between constitutionally legitimate and politically acceptable. It
is, however, important to separate the political from the consti-
tutional arguments regarding censure, as I attempt to do below.
In doing so, I hope to clarify at the very least the constitution-
ality of a censure of a president-or, for that matter, any other
official-for misconduct, particularly of the sort that does not
rise to the level of an impeachable offense.
In my opinion, every conceivable source of constitutional
authority-text, structure, original understanding, and historical
practices-supports the legitimacy of the House's and/or the
Senate's passage of a resolution expressing disapproval of the
President's conduct. First, there are several textual provisions
of the Constitution confirming the House's or the Senate's au-
thority to memorialize its opinions on public matters. The Con-
stitution authorizes the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate each to "keep a Journal of its Proceedings,"2 and provides
that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [members]
shall not be questioned in any other Place."' Moreover, the
First Amendment4 presumably protects, individually or collec-
tively, members' expressions of opinion about an official's mis-
conduct. One may plainly infer from these various textual pro-
visions the authority of the House, the Senate, or both to pass
a non-binding resolution expressing an opinion-pro or con-on
some public matter, such as that a president's conduct has been
reprehensible or worthy of condemnation.
Second, the passage of resolutions critical of a president is
quite compatible with the constitutional structure. Contrary to
the assertions of some censure opponents during the impeach-
ment proceedings against President Clinton, the Constitution
does not establish impeachment as the only constitutionally au-
thorized means by which the House or the Senate may "cen-
sure" the President. Instead, impeachment is the only means by
which the House may formally charge and thereby obligate the
Senate to consider removing a president for certain kinds of
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
3. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
4. Id. amend. I.
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misconduct.5 Removal and disqualification are the only sanc-
tions that the Senate may impose if it were to convict an im-
peached official at the end of an impeachment trial.6 Other-
wise, the constitutional structure leaves several fora besides
impeachment available to secure the accountability of an im-
peachable official for misconduct, including but not limited to
that which does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense.
These fora include civil proceedings (such as in Clinton v.
Jones'), criminal process, the court of public opinion, the elec-
toral process, the political process-broadly understood, and, of
course, the judgment of history.
Moreover, it is nonsensical to think that if a resolution has
no legal effect, it somehow still might violate the law. By defi-
nition, a resolution has no effect on the law (or legal arrange-
ments) in any way.' To think that a resolution might have
little or no practical effect is not a reason to think that it is
unconstitutional; it is a reason to think perhaps that a resolu-
tion critical of the President might be a futile act politically.
The calculation of whether a resolution is a worthwhile endeav-
or politically is separate and distinct from whether it is consti-
tutional.
In addition, the House and the Senate each have passed
more than a dozen resolutions condemning or criticizing the
misconduct of presidents and other high-ranking officials. In-
deed, on at least two occasions, the House has memorialized its
disapproval of presidential misconduct.9 Moreover, though the
House decided not to impeach President John Tyler for his
exuberant exercises of his veto authority, the House did adopt a
Committee report that was highly critical of President Tyler's
construction and use of his veto authority.' ° In addition, the
Senate censured President Andrew Jackson for firing his Trea-
5. See id. art. II, § 4.
6. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
7. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
8. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1310-11 (6th ed. 1990).
9. The subjects of these latter resolutions were Presidents James Polk and
James Buchanan.
10. See JACK MASKELL, 98-843: CENSURE OF THE PRESIDENT BY THE CONGRESS
(Cong. Res. Serv. Dec. 8, 1998).
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sury Secretary for refusing to implement President Jackson's in-
structions to withdraw national bank funds and to deposit them
in state banks.1'
Such resolutions provide historical precedents for the House
and the Senate to do something similar with respect to a presi-
dent (or any other official). For that matter, the thousands of
resolutions that the House and the Senate each have passed
over the years expressing opinions on a wide variety of public
matters constitute other relevant precedents supporting the
House's or the Senate's passage of a resolution expressing its
condemnation or disapproval of a president's conduct. 2
Last but not least, the consideration of the constitutionality
of censure raises questions about the legitimacy of another
mechanism-what came to be known as a "finding of fact"-the
feasibility of which arose in the midst of the Senate's consider-
ation of the impeachment charges against President Clinton.
The proposal was initially suggested by, among others, Senator
Susan Collins (R-Me.), who early in the proceedings professed
to be intrigued by a proposal suggested years ago by University
of Chicago Law School Professor Joseph Isenbergh.
Professor Isenbergh recently amended his earlier proposal in
light of the current political situation and suggested that the
Constitution allowed the House to impeach, and the Senate to
convict, certain kinds of officials for misconduct that did not
rise to the level of impeachable offenses.'" According to Profes-
sor Isenbergh, only removal, as opposed to conviction, constitu-
tionally required a two-thirds vote of the Senate and proof or
evidence of impeachable offenses. 4 Professor Isenbergh based
this reading of the Constitution on the fact that the textual
provisions setting forth the House's and Senate's respective
authorities regarding impeachment do not contain within them
11. See id.
12. Indeed, the House has also passed at least three resolutions expressing its
disapproval of conduct by high-ranking executive officials other than the President,
while the Senate passed two such resolutions in the nineteenth century. See id.
13. See Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and President Immunity from Judicial
Process 14, University of Chicago School of Law Occasional Paper No. 39 (Dec. 31,
1998).
14. Cf. id. at 41-43 (discussing the conviction-removal dichotomy in the context of
the impeachment trail of Judge John Pickening in 1803).
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any express limitations, such as that the powers must be con-
fined to the scope of impeachable offenses or, in the case of the
Senate, to removal.15
In addition, Professor Isenbergh relied on the fact that in a
couple of early impeachment proceedings, such as the impeach-
ment trial of Judge John Pickering, the Senate took separate
votes on guilt and on removal. 6 Professor Isenbergh's analysis
led several senators, particularly Republican Susan Collins of
Maine, to believe it would have been possible for senators to
find the President guilty of some misconduct without having to
remove him from office. This vote would have occurred before
and would have been separate from a formal vote of conviction
or removal. Moreover, some senators regarded a finding of fact
to have been indistinguishable from censure. In the latters'
opinion, the finding of fact would have embodied or represented
nothing more than an expression of opinion about whether an
official had done something. As such, a finding of fact conceiv-
ably would have been constitutional for many of the same rea-
sons as censure would have been.
The proposed finding of fact, to the extent it relies on Profes-
sor Isenbergh's textual analysis, rests on a flawed reading of
the impeachment clauses. It is mistaken to read the impeach-
ment clauses in a disjointed or disconnected fashion. Instead,
they should be read together, as a coordinated and coherent
whole. When read in this fashion, it is clear that the impeach-
ment clauses all have in common the obvious-impeachment-
and impeachment is necessarily defined by its scope. The point
of enumerated powers is that powers have limitations, and im-
peachment has its limits in the constitutional language, "Trea-
son, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."'7
To disconnect either the House's or the Senate's impeachment
power from the scope of impeachable offenses not only does
damage to the coherence of the constitutional text and consti-
tutional structure, but also opens the door to extraordinary
abuse on the part of either the House or the Senate, for each
would then be completely unchecked and unbounded-constitu-
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cls. 6-7.
16. See Isenbergh, supra note 13, at 42.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 4.
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tionally-from impeaching or convicting on whatever basis
struck its fancy. Nothing confirms more dramatically that no
such door was ever meant to be opened than the debates on
impeachment in the constitutional and ratifying conventions.
Throughout these debates, it was always clear that one of the
framers' most important objectives in designing the impeach-
ment process was to define narrowly-certainly, much more
narrowly than Great Britain had ever done-the scope of the
impeachment power."8
Another major problem with the finding of fact had to do
with the uncertainty over whether it was meant only to be an
expression of negative opinion about the President. Indeed, its
timing-prior to the adjournment of the impeachment tri-
al-made its status as an expression of opinion or something
else dangerously ambiguous. As long as the Senate's vote on
the finding of fact occurred as part of the impeachment trial, it
could easily have been confused with a vote of conviction, and
no doubt some senators understood it as tantamount to the
latter. Undoubtedly, many senators who supported the finding
of fact were motivated in part by their desire to prevent the
President from claiming vindication or acquittal if the Senate
failed to convict him for perjury or obstruction of justice. The
finding of fact would have allowed these senators to suggest
that the President had in fact been found guilty of certain mis-
conduct (as defined in the finding of fact) by whatever number
of senators had voted in favor of the finding of fact. Conse-
quently, the finding of fact seemed to have represented for
some senators a device to bring about a conviction (or the like)
without the requisite vote.
If the finding of fact were the same as or tantamount to a
vote of conviction, then at least two-thirds of the senators
would have had to vote in favor of it in order for it to have had
the effect of a conviction. If at least two-thirds of the senators
had voted in favor of it, it almost certainly would have served
as a conviction, and its subject-the President-would have
been removed from office. If two-thirds of the senators had not
voted in favor of the finding of fact, then the President almost
18. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 3-21 (1996).
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certainly would have been entitled to claim that the vote should
have counted as an acquittal.
Indeed, if senators had been required to take another vote on
whether to convict or remove the President after having voted
on the finding of fact, the President would probably have had
good reason to claim a violation of fundamental fairness. For a
vote on conviction following a vote on the finding of fact would
have appeared to allow some senators the chance to try to
convict the President on more than one vote-through the vote
on the finding of fact and through the subsequent vote on con-
viction or removal. Subjecting the President to a vote of convic-
tion more than once would have subjected him to a dubious and
arguably spiteful process, and the result surely would have
been perceived to have been unfair.
In the end, it is far from clear the extent to which censure
might arise as an option in some future proceedings in which
the members of Congress are considering the appropriate re-
sponse to evidence or proof of presidential (or some other high-
ranking official's) misconduct. Congress in the nineteenth centu-
ry did not doubt that censure-or rebuke or condemnation by
means of resolution-was available as an option for condemning
official misconduct, particularly in the circumstance in which
members believed that the misconduct did not rise to the level
of an impeachable offense. In the latter part of the twentieth
century, the House and the Senate each failed to take formal
votes on censure; but censure itself failed for political, not con-
stitutional, reasons.
Parliamentary maneuvering prevented a vote on censure in
both the House and the Senate. Those who opposed a formal
vote on censure based their opposition on the desire to have the
formal record reflect that impeachment was the only viable
option or, alternatively, to deny the President's democratic sup-
porters the "political cover" 9 to denounce without having to
convict or remove the President for his misconduct. The final
maneuvering underscored the extent to which impeachment is a
political process, one in which all of the critical choices are as
19. Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) used this terminology during the discussion of
censure in the Senate. See Wladyslaw Pleszczynski, About This Month, AM. SPECT-
ATOR, Mar. 1999, at 4, 4.
1999]
40 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:33
much political as they are constitutional. Such is the case as
well with censure, for it too is as much a political as a constitu-
tional choice. Consequently, the important thing in the future is
to remember in a debate on censure or impeachment that not
everything that is constitutional is politically feasible or desir-
able, while not everything that is politically popular or expedi-
ent is unconstitutional.
